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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In this edition of the Denning Law Journal we are celebrating the 800 
years of the Magna Carta, but compared to some declarations the Magna 
Carta is a mere fledgling. Those with knowledge of the medical profession 
will be well versed in the Hippocratic Oath,
1
 which garnered a 
fundamental role in medical training during the Hellenic period.
2
 In more 
recent years, the Hippocratic Oath has been revitalised in the form of the 
Declaration of Geneva,
3
 and is still used as part of medical training today. 
Over time the Oath has been modified to adopt a more progressive 
stance,
4
 nevertheless in one key ethical principle remains untouched, that 
of confidentiality. 
                                                     
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Buckingham 
1
 Named after Hippocrates who was born on the Greek island of Cos. He lived 
between 460-380 BC approximately. He was a renowned physician and teacher of 
medicine and belonged to a guild of doctors known as the Ascelepiadae. 
Although attributed to him, some believe the oath „predates his own school‟: see 
JK Mason and GT Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (9th 
edition, Oxford University Press 2013) 3. 
2
 From 510-323 BC Classical Greece. 
3
 First adopted by the General Assembly of the World Medical Association at 
Geneva 1948, the most recent version was modified and agreed in 2006 at 
Divonne-les-Bains, France. 
4
 The introduction of the Abortion Act 1967 could be considered a flagrant breach 
of the Hippocratic Oath. 
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English law pays great respect to the principle of confidentiality; as 
noted by the Supreme Court in 2013 it is “an overriding principle and is 
central to trust between patients and doctors”.5 English law also ensures 
that the “obligation of confidence is capable of surviving the death of the 
patient”.6 This does not mean that a patient‟s confidentiality is always 
maintained, and there are a number of situations where information is 
shared with third parties,
7
 for example where the law demands disclosure,
8
 
if a doctor suspects his or her patient is the victim of abuse,
9
 or where 
significant public interests exists.
10
 However, in the recent High Court 
decision in ABC (Claimant) v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust and 
Others
11
 the Court was emphatic that a duty of care in regards to 
disclosure of confidential information was not owed to the direct 
descendants of those with severe hereditary conditions.  
 
2. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE  
 
In 2007, the claimant‟s (ABC‟s) father (F) shot and killed ABC‟s 
mother (F‟s wife). He was convicted of voluntary manslaughter on the 
grounds of diminished responsibility. However it was not until 2009 that 
the underlying cause of the “diminished responsibility”was identified 
                                                     
5
 West London Mental Health NHS Trust (Respondent) v Chhabra (Appellant) 
[2013] UKSC 80, [33] (Lord Hodge). 
6
 Lewis v Secretary of State for Health [2008] EWHC 2196 [24] echoing the 
Declaration of Geneva which states „I will respect the secrets which are confided 
in me, even after the patient has died‟. 
7
 The least controversial situation will occur where the patient themselves, 
authorises medical information to be shared to a third party.  
8
 For example if there is a statutory requirement that a patient has a notifiable 
disease e.g. cholera or smallpox. 
9
 R v Alan Wilson [1996] Crim LR 573; R v Emmett [1999] EWCA Crim 1710. 
10
 W v Egdell [1990] 1 All ER 835. 
11
 ABC (Claimant) v (1) St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust (2) South West 
London And St George’s Mental Health NHS Trust (3) Sussex Partnership NHS 
Foundation Trust (Defendants) [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB) (ABC v others). This 
was an application by the defendants to strike out the claim. (If the Courts find 
that a case does not specify a cause of action, or that there is no reasonable 
grounds for either bringing or defending the claim they have the power to strike 
out part or all of it and bring an end to proceedings quickly). 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
 283 
when a full medical diagnosis of Huntingdon‟s disease (HD) made.12 As 
part of his rehabilitation, family counselling was engaged between F and 
his daughters, (one of whom was the claimant, ABC). When his HD was 
first diagnosed, F demanded that doctors obey their duty of confidentiality 
and withhold knowledge of the condition from ABC. Four meetings 
occurred in 2009 between F and ABC with a representative of the family 
therapy team. Additionally, ABC submitted that she had attended various 
multi-disciplinary meetings relating to her father‟s care. During these 
conferences, healthcare workers honoured F‟s desire to keep his diagnosis 
a secret from ABC, albeit that there had been discussions among staff as 
to whether the Claimant should be informed about the diagnosis,
13
 
particularly as she was pregnant at the time.  
ABC gave birth to her daughter in April 2010, oblivious to her 
father‟s diagnosis of HD. She may have remained ignorant of this 
indefinitely had she not been accidently informed of it in August of that 
year by one of her father‟s doctors.14 The discovery of this, at the time and 
in the manner that it occurred, was said to have caused psychiatric injury 
to ABC. At this point it is apposite to discuss HD to understand the 
rationale behind the claim and its defence.  
 
3. HUNTINGDON’S DISEASE (HD) 
 
HD is the result of a genetic error. There are some 20,000 to 25,000 
genes in the human body, (usually) arranged in 46 chromosomes: 22 pairs 
of autosomes, and one “pair” of sex chromosomes. HD is caused by a 
mutation to one specific gene, known as the HTT gene, located on 
autosome 4. This HTT gene is responsible for producing a protein, known 
as Huntingtin.
15
 A mutation to the HTT gene causes the body to produce a 
rogue version of this protein.
16
 For reasons as yet unknown by scientists, 
                                                     
12
 This is also known as Huntington‟s chorea. Chorea was extrapolated from the 
Greek word „khoreia‟ which means „dancing‟ as those with this condition often 
develop random limb movements which can appear to be dance-like. 
13
 ABC v Others [5]. 
14
 Ibid [2]. 
15
 This gene was discovered in 1993. Those with HD produce a mutated version 
of Huntingtin. 
16
 The mutation involves segment known as a CAG trinucleotide repeat. This 
segment is composed of 3 out of 4 nucleo-base, namely cytosine, adenine, and 
guanine (the other being thymine). To operate fully, this CAG segment needs to 
repeat 10 to 35 times within the gene, but for those with HD the CAG segment is 
repeated 36 to „more than 120 times‟. The more repeats that occur, the more 
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the mutant form of protein ultimately inflicts damage to nerve cells in 
various regions of the brain including the basal ganglia and the sub-cortex. 
Amongst other physical symptoms,
17
 the damage leads to “behavioural 
problems”.18 
Unlike autosomal recessive hereditary conditions which require both 
parents to be sufferers of the condition or carriers of the faulty gene in 
order to inherit the full condition,
19
 HD is an autosomal dominant 
condition.
20
 Therefore if one parent has the faulty gene, there is a 50 per 
cent chance that each of their progeny will inherit the gene, and ultimately 
develop HD.
21
 As with many conditions, symptoms vary enormously from 
person to person. Some will face only mild alternations to their daily 
routines whereas for others symptoms will be “profound”, affecting 
everyone around them.
 22
 F‟s condition was “thought to have had some 
bearing” on the murder of his wife.23 
Having discovered her father‟s condition, ABC grew concerned for 
not just her well-being but additionally that of her daughter. In 2013 her 
fears were confirmed that she had inherited HD. She was additionally 
concerned for the welfare of her child. As of date it is unknown whether 
her daughter has inherited that disease as well, as testing for HD does not 
take place before the age of majority.
24
 However, ABC contended that had 
she known that she had a heredity condition, she would have undergone a 
termination of her pregnancy.  
                                                                                                                        
severe the condition is likely to be. Genetics Home Reference (US National 
Library of Medicine), „What is Huntington Disease?‟  
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/huntington-disease accessed 2 July 2015. 
17
 Such as the „dance-like‟ physical movements, (see further n 12).  
18
 Huntingdon‟s Disease Association, „Behaviour Problems‟ (May 2012) 
http://hda.org.uk/hda/factsheets/ accessed 2 July 2015. 
19
 Such is case, for example with those born with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia 
(CAH).  
20
 Occasionally a sufferer will have a spontaneous mutation without his or her 
parents passing on the condition, but it may be the case the in the parent the 
condition is extremely mild and it has not been diagnosed. 
21
 As there will always be at least a 50:50 chance that they inherit the autosome 4 
which is carrying the faulty gene. (If both parents have the condition the chance 
of inheritance will be greater.) 
22
 Huntingdon‟s Disease Association, „Behaviour Problems‟ (May 2012) 
http://hda.org.uk/hda/factsheets/ accessed 2 July 2015. 
23
 ABC v Others [17]. 
24
 In England this is 18 years of age: section 1 Family Law Reform Act 1969. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
 285 
ABC therefore argued that the defendants, (doctors and other 
professionals) owed her a duty of care to disclose her father‟s HD, and in 
not informing her, doctors had breached their duty of care towards her. 
She contended that she had suffered psychiatric harm as a result of the 
lack of disclosure. Not only that, ABC submitted that if her daughter has 
also inherited the disease, this would cause additional financial expense. 
She further argued that the defendants had violated her rights under 
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). By 
contrast, the defendants sought a motion to strike out the claim at an early 
stage on the basis of no reasonable cause of action, i.e. that firstly, 
although the duty of confidentiality might not always be absolute, this did 
not create a duty of care; and secondly, that no breach of Article 8 ECHR 
could be proved in this particular claim. 
In regard to the claim in negligence, the Defendants relied on the 
leading judgment of Caparo v Dickman,
25
 which specifies the three-part 
test to be used when assessing if a duty of care is owed in novel situations. 
Interestingly the Defendants were prepared to accept that there was 
“sufficient proximity” between themselves and ABC and that any injury 
ABC suffered as a result of non-disclosure would have been “reasonably 
foreseeable.”26 However, they argued, there was no reasonable prospect of 
the Claimant establishing that it would be fair, just or reasonable to 
impose on the Defendants a duty of care towards the Claimant in this 
regard,
27
 and put forward nine reasons why a duty of care should not be 
found.
28
  
 
i. What was put against the public interest in preserving 
confidence in the present context was not a public 
interest in disclosure, but the private interest of the 
Claimant. 
ii. The law of confidence allowed a doctor to disclose 
confidential information in certain circumstances (...) 
The Claimant was contending for a duty to do so. 
Consciously or unconsciously, this might encourage 
doctors to breach confidence where it might not 
otherwise have been justified. 
                                                     
25
 Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. 
26
 ABC v Others [11]. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid [13]. These submissions are discussed later. 
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iii. Doctors would be subject to conflicting duties, liable 
to be sued by their patient if they disclose 
information which should have remained 
confidential, liable to be sued by a third party, such 
as the Claimant, if they fail to disclose information 
which they should have revealed. 
iv. If a doctor is subject to a duty of care in some 
situations to disclose information to third parties, it 
will undermine the trust and confidence which is so 
important to the doctor/patient relationship. It may 
lead to patients being less candid with their doctors. 
(...) 
v. If doctors owed a duty of care to third parties, it may 
result in doctors putting pressure on their patients to 
agree to disclosure to avoid the risk of being sued by 
third parties. 
vi. Some third parties may not wish to receive 
information. Yet a doctor may not be able to explore 
whether this is the case without effectively imparting 
the information itself. 
vii. It is possible that the third party may suffer 
psychiatric harm if he or she is told the information 
in question. The doctor will be in a dilemma as to 
how to explore whether this is the case when the 
third party is not or may not be his or her patient. 
viii. Doctors receive a very great deal of confidential 
information. It would be burdensome to place on 
them a duty to consider whether any of it needs to be 
disclosed to third parties. The time and resources 
committed to this will be a distraction from treating 
patients. 
ix. This significant extension of a doctor‟s duty of care 
would be contrary to the incremental way in which 
the law of negligence ought to progress.  
 
In summary, whilst it was noted that on occasions there are times 
when doctors are owed a positive duty to breach confidentiality, it was 
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argued that it would “not make it fair, just or reasonable”, to impose a 
duty of care on the Defendants to the Claimant, “in the current case.”29  
Conversely the counsel for ABC argued, inter alia, that the claimant 
was “not just any third party,”30 but F‟s daughter; that F‟s ability to make 
an informed decision to withhold his diagnosis had not been properly 
addressed by his healthcare workers,
31
 moreover that, the General Medical 
Council Guidance indicated that doctors “might be under a positive duty 
to do disclose information” on occasions. In conclusion counsel argued 
that finding a duty of care in this situation would not be “so novel a 
development as the Defendants submitted”.32 Nicol J found that the 
claimants had relied on cases which were conventional doctor-patient 
relationships,
33
 consequently to find a duty of care in this case would be a 
novel departure.  
By comparison, the Defendants relied on the House of Lords decision 
of X v Bedfordshire County Council
34
 and the subsequent Court of Appeal 
decision in Powell v Boladz.
35
 These stipulated categorically that no duty 
of care was owed to those with close family connections, but merely to the 
person themselves. Further the case of X warned of the danger of 
                                                     
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid [15]. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid [16]. 
33
 A v East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 1038 
(QB) where a mother to be complained that she had not been told during antenatal 
visits that her baby might be suffering from a chromosomal abnormality. She 
would have terminated the pregnancy had she known. Nor was the case of Angela 
P v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 560 
of any help to the claimant. In this case a woman had given birth to a child with a 
disability after undergoing sterilisation. It was held that the hospital was liable for 
the costs of bringing up a disabled child, but not the costs which would have been 
incurred in bringing up a healthy child.  
34
 X v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, where parents, having had 
their children removed from them for fear of abuse, brought claims in negligence 
against those authorities responsible on the ground that the abuse assessments 
were carelessly made. The claims were said to offer no reasonable cause of action 
and were struck out. 
35
 Powell v Boladz [1998] Lloyds Rep Med 116. In this case, parents brought a 
claim in negligence, alleging, that the father suffered psychiatric damaged on 
discovering that various records connected with his young son‟s treatment had 
been altered after his death. The court was emphatic that the doctor owed no duty 
of care to the parents, only to the son. 
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imposing additional levels of duty of care on public bodies lest they 
adopted a defensive mode of performance.
36
 
Very little argument was put forward as regards the Article 8 issue. It 
was specified that the Claimant had to prove “that the positive duty 
implicit in Article 8 required the Defendants to disclose her father‟s 
condition to her”.37 The Judge did not find this was the case. Overall 
Nichol J held that to found a duty of care would be a “radical departure”38 
from current law and that overall “the balance (came) down decisively 
against the Claimant” and acceded to the defendants‟ request to strike out 
the claim.
39
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
This is an unpopular decision.
40
 It is certainly unsatisfactory in a 
number of respects. Gilbar and Foster point out that ABC‟s autonomy and 
her reproductive rights, at least equalled that of F‟s right to 
confidentiality,
41
 and that the decision in this action “is embarrassingly at 
odds” with the leading judgments of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health 
Board
42
 and Chester v Afshar.
43
 They further emphasis the importance of 
the specific epidemiology of HD itself as HD “carries an immutable death 
sentence”.44 
When looking at the nine points point forward by counsel for the 
defence, it seems relatively easy to rebut a number of them.
45
 At point (i) 
it was noted that this was not a matter of “public interest in disclosure, but 
the private interest of the Claimant” and further (iv) that would undermine 
the trust and confidence in the doctor/patient relationship. It is 
                                                     
36
 X v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 [750]. 
37
 ABC v others [37]. 
38
 Ibid [27]. 
39
 Ibid [38]. 
40
 Roy Gilbar Charles Foster, „Do I Have a Right to Access my Father‟s Genetic 
Account?‟ Practical Ethics (Oxford, 29 May 2015)  
http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/do-i-have-a-right-to-access-my-
fathers-genetic-account/ accessed 5 July 2015. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
43
 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41. 
44
 Gilbar and Foster (n 40). 
45
 ABC v Others [13]. It is submitted that point ix) the „significant extension of a 
doctor‟s duty of care would be contrary to the incremental way in which the law 
of negligence ought to progress‟ is a matter of opinion rather than law.  
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acknowledged that there was a private interest of the client, but it can also 
be argued that it is in the general interest to understand the morphology 
behind a murder charge. It is submitted when a serious crime is committed 
it is in everyone‟s interest to understand a contributory factor to this. Point 
(ii) suggested that this “might encourage doctors to breach confidence 
where it might not otherwise have been justified”. It is submitted that this 
would not be the case in general. Point (ii) puts the opposing view that if a 
duty was found in this case, in the future a doctor may be sued for non-
disclosure in similar circumstances, or put pressure on patients to disclose 
(v). It is possible that this is the case, but narrowing down the duty to 
direct descendants would limit the scope of the duty. This would also 
mitigate the argument put forward in point (viii) in terms of relieving the 
burden and (perhaps more pertinently) the cost of the extent of the 
disclosure. 
The most interesting tensions occur at points (vi) and (vii). These 
arguments suggest that “third parties may not wish to receive information” 
and “may suffer psychiatric harm if…told the information in question.” 
Whilst the first of these propositions is a valid concern, current English 
law already addresses this latter issue succinctly. By virtue of the Data 
Protection Act 1998
46
 (DPA) and its supporting secondary legislation, the 
Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) Order 2000 (SI 
2000/413),
47
 Article 5(1) specifies that exceptions from disclosure under 
section 7 DPA apply if such disclosure “may cause serious harm to the 
physical or mental health” of the person concerned, “or any other 
person”.48 Furthermore, the courts have confirmed that access to 
information is not an unqualified right, provided the non-disclosure can be 
justified.
49
 It is submitted that if ABC was considered competent, and 
capable of receiving vitally important information about her health, that 
this should have been recognised, and her father‟s diagnosis disclosed, 
particularly in light of all the surrounding facts.  
F had murdered his wife. In order to reconcile F and his daughters 
family therapy was employed. It is submitted that it would have been 
                                                     
46
 Section 7 of the DPA specifies that individuals may make a written request to 
an organisation to see any personal information held about them by that 
organisation.  
47
 This replaced the Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) 
Order 1987 (SI No 1903). 
48
 Article 5(1) provides that „Personal data to which this Order applies are exempt 
from section 7 in any case to the extent to which the application of that section 
would be likely to cause serious harm to the physical or mental health or 
condition of the data subject or any other person‟.  
49
 Roberts v Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 1934 (QB). 
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conducive to all if F‟s condition were discussed in an open forum. It is 
difficult for children to come to terms with the murder of one parent by 
another and to discover that, in part, this was caused by a circumstance 
beyond F‟s control would have assisted in this matter. Further, having 
discovered that F had such a condition, and knowing that his daughters 
consequently had a 50 per cent of inheriting this, it seems unreasonable 
that silence should prevail.
50
 To encourage situations where the law 
upholds non-disclosure is perilously close to creating legal obligations to 
withhold essential health information from the persons concerned. A 
move in this direction would be unduly harsh. Whilst not wishing to add 
to their burdens, it does not seem unreasonable that a doctor‟s duty is 
extended to disclosing genetic information to direct descendants.
51
  
This decision potentially creates a further barrier to those who wish to 
understand their medical conditions. It has long been the situation that 
testing for HD cannot be undertaken until a young person reaches the age 
of 18. This means that direct descendants of those with HD, who often 
witness the demise of their parents or grandparents, are left in limbo until 
they are old enough to be tested themselves. This is not a satisfactory 
position. A considerable length of time has passed since Professor 
Dickenson‟s article promoting the right to earlier testing was published,52 
but although many are in argument with the stance taken by Dickenson, 
the situation remains the same. Let us hope that common sense will 
prevail, and this case does not act to prevent any further disclosure of 
truth. 
                                                     
50
 Albeit that HD cannot be prevented, the symptoms can at least be ameliorated 
with medicine, knowledge and care. 
51
 Even if such information was not to be disclosed until children reached the age 
of 18. 
52
 Donna L Dickenson, „Can Children and Young People Consent to be Tested for 
Adult Onset Genetic Disorders?‟ (1999) 318 BMJ 1063. 
